By the time I was born, the Vietnam War had been over for 13 years. But, my parents generation, the so-called Baby Boomers of the post-WWII era protested, petitioned, fought and died on the battlefields of Vietnam and Universities like Berkeley, Columbia, Stanford, Yale, UCLA and Cal State Northridge. Their dissent against an increasingly unpopular war, along with the military defeat as the tanks of Ho Chi Minh rolled into Saigon galvanized the nation and left a lasting scar that still continues today. Did we know it was a Nationalist war instead of Communist War of Aggression? Was there such thing as a Communist Monolith that bounded China, the USSR and all other "wars of liberation" together? If Vietnam fell to the Communist forces, would, as Eisenhower put it in 1960, the "dominoes fall?" Did we have enough expertise in the military, Congress or government to fight an affective war against the forces of Ho Chi Minh?
Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense under Kennedy and Johnson, tries to reconcile these points, avoid a catharsis, debunk the myth that this was in fact "McNamara's War" and try to beat it into our heads that policy in Vietnam was "wrong, terribly wrong."The book starts out with a history of McNamara's exploits from turning down Stanford to go to Berkeley and accepting admissions to Harvard Business School. From Harvard, after meeting his wife, he joined the army and joined up with Curtis LeMay on strategic Bombing. When he worked for LeMay he was responsible for putting statistics on bombing raids, which LeMay was obsessed about. LeMay wanted to improve night and day bombing raids and reduce causalities. McNamara was on staff when LeMay ordered the fire bombing of Tokyo, which killed nearly 200,000 people and burned part of Tokyo to the ground. When the war ended, after recovering from Polio, McNamara was hired at Ford Motor Company. He became part of the "Whiz Kids" who worked towards revolutionizing Ford. McNamara was an unusual entity at Ford, as he pushed for better fuel efficiency, environmental standards and safety, which were not popular in car culture. This led to many failures and many successes. Eventually he became President of Ford, the first President not to be a descendent of the Ford family. 6 week after accepting the position he was called by President Kennedy and offered the position of Defense Secretary.
At first, McNamara thought that he was not qualified for the position because of his lack of political skills and military experience. Kennedy's response was "there is not school for Defense Secretaries...there is not school for Presidents." McNamara and the Kennedy family got close during his few years as president. In the book McNamara talks in detail about his conversations with Kennedy and Kennedy's reactions to such events as the Diem assassination. He sincerely believed that if Kennedy had lived, he would have pulled the troops out of Vietnam before a ground war could ensue. It was during this time that McNamara created his own perspective on Vietnam, which was that it was a war that the South had to fight for themselves. They had to make their own destiny. While we could send "advisers" and bolster a government against Ho Chi Minh, we could not fight their war.
After Kennedy's assassination, and Johnson's ascension, McNamara was reassigned as Secretary of Defense. During the first few years of the Johnson administration, up to the fateful Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the populace remained heavily in favor of helping South Vietnam defeat the communists. And, Johnson reiterated his point that he would not send "American boys" to fight for South Vietnam, because it was their responsibility to fight their own war. But, Johnson kept what they called A34, a covert operation in helping forces in South Vietnam strike at strategic targets in the North. But, after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed in Congress allowing a blank check for fighting the war, limited bombing of targets in Vietnam ensued, and finally, under pressure from Gen Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs, troops were added. This is where McNamara says he finally began to realize that they could not win a military war on the ground. The North was able to coordinate strikes into the south, inflict damage and quickly disappear. His objections and attempts to negotiate were poor and befuddled by bombing in the North, and eventually after a disastrous hearing in front of the Arms Service Committee and a charge from Sen. Strom Thurmond that he was a "communist appeaser" McNamama left to become president of the World Bank.
The book is heavy in policy analysis and document citing. McNamara did his research, and in a very McNamara way, was very rational about it. But what is most compelling is his belief that we can take this book and use it for its lessons. The lessons are more like points, 11 in all, which outline his and other policy figures' failures in Vietnam. The most compelling ones are:
1.Misjudging the Enemy both on terms of communist aggression and nationalistic tendencies. In other words, was Ho Chi Minh a Tito or a Stalin? In the end he was a nationalist, like Tito.
2. The support of a government that was a complete failure, and the fact that they refused to believe that the government would fail. This fact came to a head after the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem and the realization that the inept generals who followed him continued infighting a civil war, which destabilized the country.
3. The lack of information on the history and situation as it was in Vietnam. This was led, in part, by the relentless belief in the Domino Theory. But, it also led to the belief that the US could instill a democratic stability into an unstable country, whose history lacked any sort of democracy in the first place.
4. They did not consider the alternatives. Policy makers around President Johnson, and McNamara himself, while aware of the need to have dialogue with both the American people and outside policy experts and the alternatives to military intervention, they did not go through with them. One of these included disengagement.
5. The failure to recognize the actual threat to US security. The question arises: If Vietnam fell, would the dominoes fall in SE Asia, and would that be a huge blow to American National Security? The obvious answer, in retrospect, was No. But, that was never a consideration, as it was a concept set-in-stone, much like the Domino Theory.
6. Ignoring both the hearts and minds of Vietnamese citizens and the opinions of domestic protest movements. This led to degradation of popular opinion of the government and McNamara at home, and the loss in any kind of moral authority in Vietnam.
McNamara was vilified, protested, assaulted and shamed for his actions in Vietnam. It is only natural to look at the Secretary of Defense as a culprit in an unpopular war because he is responsible for conducting policy for such a war. McNamara was a product of his own intellect and his own expertise. He was a businessman and a mathematician, not a military adviser. McNamara tried to be a filter and moral compass between Johnson’s policies and the Joint Chief’s suggestions, but he failed. He failed because any sign of weakness towards communists, perceived by Congress was a political death-knell for Johnson. This is especially apparent during McNamara’s last hearing before the Arms Service Committee when he testified on the grim situation in Vietnam and the fruitless efforts that would amount from troop increases, as the Joint Chiefs had requested. This testimony was immediately rebuked by the Chiefs, Johnson was not there to support McNamara and he was named a “communist appeaser” by Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond. The Chief’s and Westmoreland proposed a high troop increase, up to nearly 700,000, and mentioned the right to reserve the use to nuclear arms if China were to enter the war. This brinksmanship, nearly 20 years old, was not a rational policy. In a nuclear exchange, with the interconnectedness of both the US and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies, would have meant disaster for the entire human race. Whether or not this was a “bid high and accept lower” strategy by the Chiefs is remained to be seen. Nonetheless, McNamara knew that brinksmanship was not a sound policy, and that troop increases in an unpopular, unwinnable war would be at the cost of more American lives. Even negotiations setup by McNamara through international counterparts in France and Sweden broke down over bombing that occurred in Hanoi on the day of the negotiations. You cannot blame any world power for refusing to go to the bargaining table when their country was being bombed. McNamara’s failure in this respect came when he did not fully express his support of a complete bombing halt in return for negotiations.
The lessons of Vietnam that McNamara lists are hauntingly relevant today. Throughout the interviews I have seen him do in the few years after his book was published, he mentions the Middle East many times. But, he mentions it in the light of his own mistakes made during the Vietnam War. Some of these lessons do apply. When we invaded Iraq, did President Bush consider how much of a realistic threat Sadaam Hussein was to American National Security? First, there were not Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq, although there was some evidence that some agents of Hussein were negotiating for Yellow Cake in Africa. Secondly, Hussein was a secular, albeit violent, ruler who was a buffer between rival Muslim religious sects. Thirdly, the connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq only occurred after our invasion, which attests to evidence that Hussein only allied with hard line religious extremists to bolster himself against the American onslaught. These points also support the idea that we underestimated our enemy, and should have considered the alternatives to marching right into Baghdad. McNamara always mentioned the decision by George HW Bush not to go into Baghdad because he knew of the security implications, as he was a former CIA director. Lastly, I think we did not take into the lesson that we had the ability to instill both stability and democracy in a place that was, first, very unstable and second, had no history of Democracy.
Our broad goal of fighting terror, or terrorism, or a “War on Terror” was misguided in its PR and was full of emotion and misdirection. The problem with concentrating the fight against terrorism on one or even two fronts is misjudging the fact that terrorists are not sedentary people and have networks, safe-houses, shelter and support from all over the world. This means that a war on terror would be both costly and lengthy. Does this make Afghanistan and Iraq proxy wars in the war on Terror, like Korea, Vietnam and our meddling in South America were proxy wars in the Cold War? I think there is possibility for a definite comparison. Expanding the war on terror using military action, which invariably results in more civilian casualties and destruction, will make extremism more palatable and attractive to the average civilian. This is the same way that a US backed regime in the South, which persecuted Buddhists and was wholly unpopular led to increasing Vietcong presence in farmers in the South. They saw the Southern government as a representative of the US, and therefore felt that the Communist North would treat them better, if they fought the American aggressors.
But, I think there is room to improve. For example, in our War on Terror proxies, we have put more emphasis on winning the hearts and minds of the populace. We have liberated them from an oppressive murderous regime and have made it a priority to instill free elections and protection for the people. We have used intelligence and language experts to negotiate with local people and tribesmen whose common enemy is Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and have had military success against the aforementioned groups as a result. Lastly, our new approach by Gen McChrystal in Afghanistan is to put protecting civilians and Afghani people as a priority over military clashes with the Taliban, which often lead to civilian casualties.
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